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PREFACE 
This study is an analysis of the risk premiums on Hre debt of 
investor-owned electric utilities based on the type of fuel used to 
generate electric power for the years 1978 through 1980. The primary 
objective is to test the hypothesis that investors, at each different 
Standard & Poor's rating level, require different risk premiums on the 
debt of investor-owned electric utilities, based on fhe dominant type 
of fuel used to generate electric power. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the mid-sixities, the electric utility industry was 
considered to be operating in a stable and predictable environment. 1 
Interest rates were quite stable, the inflation rate was low, energy 
supplies were considered infinite, and customer usage was climbing 
higher annually. The electric utilities were considered to be in an 
ideal situation for.investment. Their costs were relatively fixed 
from period to period and demand was growing due to the increasing 
number of electric labor-saving devices that were entering the market, 
consequently their common stock and debt instruments were held in high 
regard by investors. 
This idealistic situation didn't last indefinitely. Since the 
mid-sixties, all those elements which the companies and investors 
assumed to be fixed began to vary. 2' 3 Interest rates began their 
long-run climb, inflation added to the cost of construction, new 
technologies rendered old installations obsolete, and demand suddenly 
outpaced generating capacity. Two additional events that were major 
factors in determining the current environment for the utility com-
panies were: the Arab oil embargo and the accident at Three Mile 
Island. 
These latter two events introduced risk and uncertainty into a 
new dimension of electric utility operations, that of fuel supply. 
1 
Now, in addition to forecasting electricity demands and capital 
requirements, the companies were also considering two types of risk 
associated with their power plant's fuel source: disruptive risk and 
price fluctuation risk. 
Disruptive risk represents the risk that the fuel supplies to the 
electric power plant will be interrupted or stopped entirely. 
Basically, the sources of potential disruption could originate from 
any one or more of the following events: a strike, a shortage of fuel 
supplies, or a violation of EPA air and water regulations. Should 
one of these events occur, the utility would be forced to scramble to 
find another source of fuel to prevent the particular utility from 
experiencing a blackout. 
Price fluctuation risk is the risk that supply and demand factors 
2 
will work to push the price of generating fuel upward. These spiraling 
fuel costs will introduce a tremendous amount of risk-into the 
utilities' cost control which, in turn, impacts on the utilities' 
profitability due to regulatory lag. 
Since the early 1920 1 s the electric utilities have been able to 
temper some of these upward price increases through automatic fuel 
adjustment clauses (AFAC). 4 AFAC's have enabled the electric utilities 
to pass through increased fuel costs to customers before an increase 
in the rate it charges has been approved through normal regulatory 
channels. 
After the utility industry's widespread use of AFAC's during and 
after the Arab oil embargo, consumers have lashed out against this 
clause. 5 They pushed for legislation which would severly restrict or 
eliminate the fuel adjustment clauses. As a consequence, utilities 
will be forced to absorb an increasingly large share of the fuel costs 
passed on to customers. 
Objective 
This study's objective is to test the hypothesis that investors, 
at each different Standard & Poor's rating level, require different 
risk premiums on the debt of investor-owned electric utilities, based 
on the dominant type of fuel used to generate electric power. 
Underlying Assumptions 
A fundamental assumption of this paper is that the electric 
utility industry has moved over time from an environment of stability 
and certainty to one of uncertainty. This assumption is documented by 
various writers throughout the electric utility literature. 
The second major assumption recognizes the presence of two types 
of risk found in each of the primary fuel types. Disruptive risk and 
price fluctuation risk are two principal forms of fuel-specific risk 
which may shift an electric utility's debt from one risk c1ass to 
another. This shift in investment risk should result in a change in 
the bond's rating classification and interest yield in the market. 
3 
Consider the Three-Mile Island accident as an example of disruptive 
risk. Based on the above assumption, one would expect the following 
scenario to occur. The uncontrolled release of nuclear wastes into the 
environment would force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to close down 
the generating power plant. This would immediately force the company to 
purchase its power from other utilities, thereby reducing its profit 
margin on electric power sold. During this same time frame the utility 
would face additional expenses for clean-up and repair - expenses 
further reducing profits. Thus this accident would immediately 
adversely affect current earnings, cash flows, and current ratio 
analysis. The intermediate and long-term effects would be poor ratio 
analysis, a weak energy position, and a tarnished image in the eyes of 
the regulatory authorities. 
4 
Since the clean-up and repair costs of nuclear accidents are much 
greater than those associated with other fuel types, one would expect that 
nuclear fuel would be considered as one of the most risky fuel types. 
This leads to the third and final assumption, one that the financial 
community can digest the alternative risk levels corresponding to the 
disparate fuel types. The financial community relies on the services 
of the two major rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, to 
account for the business risk entailed by the financial and operating 
risks of the issuer. These differences in risk are translated into a 
graduated rating system, which is used by market investors to pre-select 
a group of utility bonds within a given rating category. 
Within the individual rating categories, investors can discriminate 
between utility bonds based on such characteristics as fuel type used 
to generate electric power. These investors have learned to assign 
risk premiums to the bond returns based on their perceptions of fuel 
source risk. 
Since the agency ratings adequately reflect differences in 
business risk, they, in turn, influence the promised yields (the lower 
the default risk, the higher the agency rating and the lower the 
prevailing yield to maturity. 6 A historical review of corporate bond 
5 
yields by ratings bears out this claim. Over the period 1929 through 
1978 the highly rated bonds maintained a consistently lower yield than 
did those bonds rated lower. 7 In fact, as one reviews the debt yields 
on highly rated securities and moves to lower rated securities, the 
amount of the risk premium on the different classes increases at an 
increasing rate. 
Significance 
This study should provide the electric utility companies with an 
idea of the financial community's awareness and perception of the varying 
risk levels among the disparate fuel types used to generate electric 
power. The recent accident at Three-Mile Island, with its tremendous 
disruptive and clean-up costs, provided a real shock to the investing 
public. It was not until this landmark event that investors took time 
to consider the various risks associated with each fuel type. 
This study's analysis of current fuel use trends and interest 
yield figures will determine if investors have responded to this shock 
by applying unique risk premiums to each different fuel source. 
Limitations 
The prime limitation of this study involves the relatively short 
time span considered. This is directly linked to the level of detailed 
information available. Only since the late seventies has published 
data been available which lists the fuel mix used by individual 
companies to generate their electric power. 
Scope 
This study was limited to the 140 investor-owned electric 
utilities operating in the United States. Only domestic utilities 
were involved in order to remove possible biases in the results due to 
currency exchange rates and national regulatory climates. Investor-
owned utilities were selected to reduce the distortions in interest 
yield on the varying fuel classes resulting from government guarantees 
sometimes found on municipal utilities. 
Forthcoming Coverage 
The remaining chapters develop this issue in more detail and 
empirically test the hypothesis. Chapter II contains a review of the 
available literature involving the history of the electric utility 
industry, the two types of risk and their association with each 
alternative fuel type, and the workings of the financial markets in 
setting yields on the electric utilities securities. Chapter III 
contains the research methodology. Included within this heading are: 
the research question, the variable definitions and measures, the 
sample selection, data collection procedures, instruments used, and 
means of analysis. Chapter IV presents the results of this study, 
while Chapter V contains a discussion of the results and a final 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
Bond Rating History 
Bond ratings are a tool for investors designed to indicate the 
ability of the issuer to meet principal and interest payments over 
time. These ratings were first introduced in 1909 by John Moody of 
Moody's Investors Servides. Moody's Services was later joined in the 
business of rating securities by the Standard & Peer's Corporation and 
the Fitch Investors Service. 
Moody's and Standard & Peer's are currently the two leaders in 
rating corporate and municipal securities. The Fitch Investors Service 
has specialized into rating bonds of financial institutions. 
Both Moody's and Standard & Peer's utilize alphabetic rating 
symbols to indicate gradations of investment quality. Moody's system 
uses nine designations of investment risk ranging from a high of Aaa 
down to a low of c. 1 Standard & Peer's utilize ten symbols to denote 
the varying levels of investment risk. Additionally, they make use 
of plus (+) and minus (-) signs to show the relative standing within 
each of the major rating categories. Their ten major symbols are: 2 
AAA - Bonds rated AAA have the highest rating assigned by 
Standard & Peer's to a debt obligation. Capacity to 
pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong. 
8 
AA - Bonds rated AA have a very strong capacity to pay 
interest and repay principal and differ from the 
highest rated issues only in small degree. 
A - Bonds rated A have a strong capacity to pay interest 
and repay principal although they are somewhat more 
susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than bonds in 
higher rated categories. 
BBB -
BB -
B 
CCC 
cc 
Bonds rated BBB are regarded as having an adeq~ate 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal. Whereas 
they normally exhibit adequate protection parameters, 
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances 
are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to pay 
interest and repay principal for bonds in this category 
than for bonds in higher rated categories. 
Bonds rated BB, B, CCC, and CC are regarded on balance, 
as predominantly speculative with respect to capacity 
to pay interest and repay principal in accordance with 
the terms of the obligation. BB indicates the lowest 
degree of speculation and CC the highest degree of 
speculation. While such bonds will likely have some 
quality and protective characteristics, these are out-
weighed by large uncertainties or major risk exposures 
to adverse conditions. 
C - The rating C is reserved for income bonds on which no 
interest is being paid. 
D - Bonds rated Dare in default, and payment of interest 
and/or repayment of principal is in arrears. 
Each of the two major rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & 
Poor 1 s, periodically review the ratings on previous rated securities. 
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Based on the facts presented during this review, the agencies may raise 
or lower their previous rating. 
Importance of the Ratings 
Because the ratings of these agencies are a valuable guide for 
investors, every company wants to insure that it receives the highest 
rating possible for its securities. 3 In fact, these ratings are crucial 
to the electric utility since a single rating can make or break a 
company's financing plan. 4 In general, the higher the rating, the 
less interest potential investors will require and the smaller will be 
the bond interest expense over the life of the issue. Conversely, 
those companies receiving a low rating may find themselves shut out 
of the bond market entirely. A low rating may further tarnish the 
company's prestige making it more difficult to issue common ·stock or 
borrow money from banks and other institutions. 5 
A historical review of corporate bond yeilds by rating indicates 
that the lower the default risk (business risk), the higher the agency 
rating and the lower the prevailing yield to maturity. 6 Over the 
period 1929 through 1978, the highly rated bonds maintained a 
consistently lower yield than those bonds rated lower. 7 In fact, it 
has been shown that the debt yields on securities increase at an 
increasing rate as the bond rating drops. 
These ratings place a great deal of power in the hands of the two 
major bond raters. Naturally their power has been questioned by the 
investment community, which has encouraged competition for the major 
rating agencies. 8 The brokerage and investment houses have entered 
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the rating game primarily refining and updating the existing ratings 
established by Moody's and Standard & Poor's. 9 It is felt that this 
competition is healthy for the industry and will prove to be beneficial 
to the investing public. 
The Rating System Described 
A description of the rating process is in order. lO Initially a 
company, working in conjunction with its investment banker, will 
11 
develop a financing plan requiring the issuance of new securities 
such as bonds. Analysts from each rating agency are then assigned to 
study the new issue. These analysts not only study the information 
provided by the issuing company, but also any historical information 
they have in their own files. They also confer with several other 
business sources, including suppliers, competitors, and customers. 
They then schedule a conference with the top executives of the issuing 
company to ascertain the past performance and future prospects for the 
company. 
Once the analysts have completed their research, they meet in a 
committee of 3 to 5 agency analysts to report their findings and rating 
recommendations. After the findings have been presented, a vote is 
taken to approve a rating, with the majority vote prevailing. 
The committee reports its recommendations to one of the managers 
in the corporate finance department. This manager can approve the 
corrmittee's recorrunendation or ask them to reconsider. Once the rating 
passes this manager it is corrmunicated to the issuing company. The 
issuing company can, if it feels under-rated, present further informa-
tion which may justify a higher rating. 
If the issuing company does appeal its rating, the rating 
corrunittee will reconvene to discuss the additional information provided 
by the issuing company. After weighing all the facts, the corrmittee 
will vote to change the rating. This time the vote must be unanimous 
or virtually so in order to result in a rating change. 
Both of the two major rating agencies charge a fee for their rating 
services. Moody's fee is based on a percentage of the dollar value of 
the securities rated. Standard & Poor's fee is based not on the value 
of the securities rated, but on the time and effort required to make 
the rating. 
Fundamental Areas of Bond Rating 
The bond rating agencies review five fundamental areas of bond 
t . 11 ra mg. These areas are: issuing documents, earnings, asset 
protection, management, and financial resources. 
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Of the various documents which accompany the issuance of bonds, the 
trust indenture is usually the basic legal document that spells out the 
contract between the issuer and the bondholder. 11 The standard 
provisions looked for in the indenture are provisions for and the 
protection against issuing additional bonds with the same security, 
property liens which may be provided, sinking fund provisions, restric-
. d lt" . d 'f th . . t t 11 t1ve covenants, an pena 1es impose 1 e prov1s1ons are no me. 
Past and foreseeable earnings are probably the single most 
important factor in the credit rating. The analysts look for strong 
cash flows generated by high and continuing earnings. They also review 
the depreciation, depletion, and amortization policies to determine if 
they are adequate for the company. Additionally, they review the 
other factors that can act upon the company's ability to generate 
earnings. 
Ratio analysis enters this third area of asset protection. This 
area is important primarily as a long-term consideration. Those ratios 
of primary interest include: the ratio of the company's current 
proposed debt to its net plant assets, the ratio of its working capital 
to its debt, the ratio of its debt to equity, and the ratio of its 
total net tangible assets to its debt. 11 
Another vital area of the analysis is the management expertise of 
the company. After conferring with the top executives, the analysts 
can assess the ability of management to work together as a team, their 
perception of their standing in the industry and their environment, 
their planning - how well they attained their previous goals and what 
goals they are currently shooting for. 
Financial resources, the fifth and final area, represents the 
largest single area in which liquidity has a direct impact on.the long 
term debt rating. This area takes into account such elements as: 
type of company and operations, territory and economy, construction 
program, capitalization and financing requirements, energy position, 
regulation, and special factors of the particular company or area. 11 
Purpose of Rating Securities 
13 
As much of a precise science as bond rating appears on the surface 
to be, bond ratings are not intended to convey anything more than credit 
safety judgements on debt securities. 12 They are not investment 
recommendations; nor do they represent audits. 12 They are also not 
ratings of a company's management or its regulators, although these two 
elements comprise a part of the rating process. 
Studies of the Rating Process 
Several studies have been undertaken to learn more about the 
procedures for applying the rating criteria to rate utility bonds. 
Thomas Fendrich, of Standard & Poor's Corporation, identifies the three 
most important rating criteria for utility bonds. 13 These criteria are: 
the fundamental business position of the utility, the regulatory 
14 
treatment, and management. These criteria have already been discussed 
as criteria in the general securities rating procedure, but have been 
more clearly focused in the case of utilities. The more conventional 
financial items of interest coverage, debt ratios, and cash flow (in 
the case of utilities) are important as primary yardsticks of financial 
performance rather than as rating criteria. 
Fendrich indicates that eleven criteria are looked into for the 
utilities: six nonfinancial and five financial. The six nonfinancial 
elements include: service area, operations, fuel supply, regulatory 
treatment, management, and the indenture. 13 The five financial rating 
criteria he delineates are: earnings protection, debt leverage, 
accounting quality, and financing flexibility. 13 
These rating criteria are utilized throughout the utility bond-
rating process. The rating agency initially develops an industry 
analysis through which qualitative judgments regarding the industry's 
strengths and weaknesses are made. The analysts then proceed to develop 
a full set of rating criteria profiles on some 300 utilities. 13 When 
the process has proceeded to the rating committee meeting, the issue 
under review is compared to similar issues in the industry. At this 
point the key strengths and weaknesses are detennined and the final 
rating is voted on. 
Ever since the bond rating system began back in 1909, the investment 
conmunity has tried to develop models which predict bond ratings. 
Whereas bond ratings contain both quantitative and qualitative elements, 
these models have focused much of their attention on the more easily 
predicted quantitative factors. 
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James Ang and Kiriritkumar Patel most recently have conducted a 
study comparing and validating bond ratings methods. 14 Their research 
had a twofold purpose. The initial purpose was to compare the available 
statistical bond rating methods on their ability to duplicate Moody's 
ratings. The subsequent purpose was to compare all bond rating methods, 
including Moody's, on their ability to predict financial distress over 
different lead times. 
The authors surveyed the four most familiar statistical bond 
rating methods which included: the Horrigan model, the West model, the 
Pogue and Soldofsky model, and the Pinches and Mingo model. The 
statistical analysis indicated that the statistical rating methods were 
consistently and significantly superior to random selection methods. 
Further testing indicated that all four methods consistently agreed 
on only the top-rated Aaa bonds. This was the result of the general 
superiority of these firm's financial records which made it easy to 
differentiate the Aaa company bonds from the lower rated bonds. The 
authors concluded that most statistical bond rating methods and the 
agencies' ratings were effective in the short-run, but were unable to 
predict financial loss in the intermediate and long-term horizons. 
The determination of long-term credit standings with financial 
ratios was the central theme of the Horrigan model. 15 Financial 
ratios were the independent variables in his study, with the dependent 
variable being the corporate bond ratings. Six classes of financial 
ratios were considered: short-term liquidity ratios; long-term 
solvency ratios; short-term capital turnover ratios; long-term capital 
turnover ratios; profit margin ratios; and return on investment ratios. 
The multiple regression of the bond ratings on the various combinations 
16 
of these independent variables was the general approach taken by 
Horrigan. 
Horrigan found that along with total assets, four ratios were 
adopted in the model for best predicting bond ratings. These four 
ratios were: working capital to sales, net worth to total debt, sales 
to net worth, and net operating profits to sales. The addition of a 
dummy legal-status variable to this model enabled Horrigan to correctly 
predict over one-half of the samples of bond ratings. 
West was dissatisfied with Horrigan's model and felt that Fisher's 
model had greater merit as a basis for further research. 16 West felt 
that Fisher's model had more thoroughly rationalized the hypothesized 
relationships between bond ratings and various independent variables. 
These relationships were more consistent with logical reasoning and 
long standing theories about the determinants of a firm's credit 
standing. Fisher's hypotheses made it possible to incorporate much 
more historical data in the model than can be accomodated in one year's 
financial statements viewed in terms of ratios. 
The objective of Fisher's study was to relate risk premiums on 
bonds to their default risk and their marketability. 17 Fisher used 
three variables together in estimating the risk of default: measure of 
the variability of the firm's earnings; measures showing how reliable 
the firm has been in meeting its obligations; and measures depending 
on the firm's capital structure. Fisher assumed a logarithmic functional 
relationship between the independent variables and risk premiums. He 
found that his four independent variables accounted for approximately 
three-fourths of the variations in the logarithms of risk premiums. He 
also noted that this relationship remained relatively stable over time. 
Using Fisher's study as a basis for his own research, West 
attempted to predict the first six of Moody's bond ratings. Employing 
four variables (the logarithms of earnings variability, period of 
solvency, market value of stocks/debt, and market value of all bonds 
outstanding) in a multiple regression model he was able to predict 
approximately 62% of the actual Moody's ratings. 
Pogue and Soldofsky used available financial and operating 
statistics to explain corporate bond ratings. 18 They used five 
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explanatory variables in their study: earnings coverage, long-term 
debt to capitalization, profitability, earnings instability, and asset 
size. Their results suggested that the differences in bond ratings 
could be explained to a significant degree by available financial and 
operating statistics. This supported the view that major differences 
in the firm's bond ratings can be explained largely by differences in 
the firm's history rather than by differences in the firm's prospects. 
Pinches and Mingo developed and tested a factor analysis/multiple 
discriminate model for predicting industrial bond ratings. 19 Their 
basic variables were: those related strictly to the bond; one year 
variables of financial characteristics; five year average variables and 
coefficients of variation. The joint application of factor analysis 
and M-group multiple discriminate analysis, in a financial context, was 
found to be both viable and essential in developing and understanding 
the model for predicting industrial ratings. Pinches and Mingo found 
that the best replications of Moody's ratings were obtained when the 
variables related to earnings stability, size, financial leverage, debt 
and debt coverage stability, return on investment, along with sub-
ordination were considered. 
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Pinches later studied electric utility bond ratings with Singleton 
and Jahankhani. 20 Their three-part study contained: a multiple 
discriminate model to predict (or discriminate among) electric utility 
bonds as rated by financial analysts for both Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's; examination of the relative importance of the financial 
variables; and a comparison of the predictive ability of the multiple 
discriminate model with that of a univariate model employing the fixed 
coverage ratio. Their variables in the multiple discriminate model 
were: regulatory climate, total assets, net income/total assets, 
earnings before interest and taxes/fixed charges, construction expenses/ 
total assets, and 1970-1975 growth rate in net earnings. 
Their six-variable model performed slightly better, in total, for 
Standard & Poor's rather than Moody's. This suggested that Standard & 
Poor 1 s bond ratings more clearly followed these six variables than did 
Moody's bond ratings. 
On an univariate basis, fixed coverage was one of the most 
important variables. On a multivariate basis, fixed coverage became 
substantially less important, while the 1970-1975 growth rate in 
earnings became the most important variable. 
The results of this study were not consistent with the assertion 
that fixed coverage alone is the primary determinant of electric 
utility bond ratings. Research also indicated that attempts in 
electric utility regulatory proceedings to specify exact fixed coverage 
ratios that must be achieved in order to maintain (or secure) a given 
bond rating were both short-sighted and incomplete. 
Reilly and Jochnk have taken a different approach to the bond 
rating analysis. 21 They have directed their attention to the 
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estimation and use of a market-determined risk measure for bonds and 
a comparative analysis of this risk measure versus the bond's assigned 
agency rating. They have hypothesized that market-determined risk 
measures for corporate bonds were inversely related to the bond ratings. 
Their study was limited to seventy-three bonds over the period 
January 1967 through December 1972. The authors collected the monthly 
quotes for the sample bonds, information on coupon payment dates and 
month of maturity. This information was used to convert each of the 
prices to their appropriate yields-to-maturity. 
Reilly and Jochnk found only a limited association between market-
related risk measures and bond ratings. 21 The reason for this limited 
association can be deducted from the explanation of the two measures. 
The rating assigned to a bond is an indication of the probability of 
default inherent in the bond based upon the financial and operating 
attributes of the firm, and the characteristics of the bond itself. In 
contrast, market related risk measures for bonds are based on how the 
market returns for a bond are related to the return for a market 
portfolio of risky assets. 
Recently the electric utility bonds have been subjected to more 
frequent revisions, both upward and downward. Seligman and Rose looked 
at the changes in Moody's bond ratings for the period 1967-1977 for 
electric utility bonds. 22 They found a pronounced decline in the 
investment status of electric utility company bonds. An expanded study 
by Merrill Lynch, published in Electrical World, likewise reported a 
decline in ratings of electric utility debt. From 1974 through 1977, 
they found some 200 changes in ratings of electric utility debt by 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's. 23 Of these 200 changes, only 20% of the 
issues were upgraded, while 80% were downgraded. 23 A casual study by 
Pamela Archbold revealed that 1974 was the year of utility bond rating 
d t . 24 emo ions. 
The reasons behind these demotions seem to stem from increasing 
worries about the construction, financing, and environmental risks 
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associated with the completion of major new generating plants.· Another 
prime factor in the rating demotions was the concern over the 
utilities' ability to pass on to the consumers the increased fuel costs 
of electric power production. Essentially, the electric utilities were 
caught in a spiral of uncertainties: the energy crises, regulation, 
and inflation. 25 
Bhandari, Soldofsky and Boe developed a model to predict these 
utility bond rating changes. 26 Their multivariate analysis included six 
variable terms. Their terms were: net income after taxes plus 
interest/interest, the slope of the regression line of the five years 
of fixed-charges-earned data preceeding the rating change (regressed 
against time); long-term debt/long-term debt plus equity; the slope of 
the regression of the five years of debt-to-capitalization data 
preceeding the rating change (regressed against time); net income after 
taxes/total assets; the slope of the regression of the five years of 
return-on-assets data preceeding the rating change (regressed against 
time); standard error of estimate from the linear regression in the 
previous term; changes in ratings, and error term. 
Their procedures indicated that the most recent level and the trend 
in the past five years of just three financial ratios: fixed-charges-
earned, debt-to capitalization, and return-on-assets, and a suitable 
measure of the earnings instability were sufficient to predict about 90% 
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of the rating changes for the electric utility bonds. 
Do these rating changes in fact have significant informational 
value for the financial markets? Hettenhouse and Sartoris searched for 
an answer to this question. 27 They considered the factors that impact 
on the bond's value such as: the coupon rate, the maturity, the term 
structure over the test period, the collateral offered, the default 
risk of the issue, and the marketability of the instrument. They then 
constructed an index to track the response of the market yields through 
time, using an average of yields for similarly rated utility bonds as 
the control group. 
They concluded that rating changes appear to be consistent with 
the underlying market activity that is setting prices on financial 
instruments. The changes themselves, however, appear to have very little 
informational value. Apparently the markets are sufficiently efficient 
to be able to set prices independently of the major ratings agencies. 
Fuel Source Risks 
Utilities are now trying to diversify their generating mix, because, 
as Guy W. Nichols, chairman of the New England Electric System, observes, 
"any one source can get you into trouble. 1125 With any fuel source there 
are two primary types of risk: disruptive risk and price fluctuation 
risk. 28 Included under the heading of disruptive risk are strikes, 
shortages, plant malfunctions, and Environmental Protection Agency EPA 
air and water pollution violations. 
Recent examples of these forms of disruptive risk can be easily 
remembered. The United Mine Worker's strike in late 1977, which lasted 
for several months, provided a vivid example as to the effects of 
strikes on electric utility fuel supplies. 29 The Arab Oil Embargo of 
1973-1974 has left a permanent impression on the people of the world. 
That one event did much to force conservation on the oil dependent 
countries -- especially the energy thirsty Americans. The malfunc-
tioning of the cooling system at the Number 2 unit of General Public 
Utilities' Three-Mile nuclear facility March 28, 1979, led to a close-
down of the reactor and the release of radioactivity into the environ-
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ment. In addition to the questions surrounding nuclear safety, new 
source performance standards for coal-fired generating units have been 
controversial. Clearly disruptive risk is a problem which faces all 
electric utilities to some degree. 
The Arab Oil Embargo skyrocketed the cost of both imported and 
domestic oil. The regulatory rate increases and the fuel adjustment 
clauses could not provide the needed rate relief fast enough for the 
utilities. 3° Consequently, they were caught in a price squeeze which 
sharply narrowed their already slim profit margins. Once again all 
electric utilities are affected by this price fluctuation risk to some 
degree. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter was written to familiarize the reader with the history 
and importance of bond ratings. Beyond those goals, it was designed to 
illustrate the complex quasi-scientific approach to rating taken by the 
two major rating agencies. With the true purpose of this process in 
mind, the reader can now understand that bonds of a similar rating class 
do have similar qualities which can permit company data grouping on the 
basis of rating. 
The final three chapters will formulate the objective of this 
report into a null hypothesis which can be statistically tested. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research methodology is designed to test the hypothesis that 
investors, at each different rating level, require different risk 
premiums on the debt of utilities which generate their electric power 
by any of six different fuel sources. Statistical tests will determine 
if these risk premiums are closely related to the type of fuel used. 
Sample Selection 
The sample under study was the entire population of investor-owned 
electric utility companies in the United States. The list of these 140 
electric utility companies and their accompanying statistics has been 
published annually since 1978 by the Interstate Securities Corporation 
in the Interstate Securities Electric Utilities Atlas. 1 These 
companies, and their corresponding numeric notation, are listed in the 
appendix of this report. 
Data Base Sources 
This atlas is unique in that it is the first known published 
source of company-specific data delineating the percentage components of 
the fuel types used to generate a company's electric power. Previous 
private publications and government documents have printed this type 
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of information on a state-wide or regional basis, but not on a 
company-by-company basis. The usefulness of statewide data on 
company-specific applications is restricted by the fact that most 
electric utility companies are not neatly confined within state 
boundaries, but overlap and bridge several state boundaries. 
The Interstate Securities Electric Utilities Atlas provided a 
percentage breakdown of the six fuel types used by each company to 
generate its electric power. These six fuel types and the numeric 
notation used through~ut this report is illustrated below. 
TABLE I 
DOMINANT FUEL SOURCE KEY 
Dominant Fuel Numerical 
Source Notation 
Gas 1 
Oil 2 
Coal 3 
Hydro 4 
Nuclear 5 
Purchase Power 6 
This same six-fuel breakdown was presented on an annual basis so that 
trends in dominant fuel usage would be revealed. 
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The Standard & Poor's bond ratings and interest yield data were 
obtained from Standard and Poor's Corporation Bond Guide. 2 This monthly 
publication grouped each electric utility's debt by its Standard & 
Poor's rating. This format made it convenient to collect the highest 
and lowest yield within a company's debt rating group. The difference 
between these high and low figures was used to compute the rang·e ( or 
spread) of the yield values. 
Non-Rated Companies 
Out of the 140 electric companies studied, there were three 
companies which did not have any outstanding debt rated by Standard & 
Poor 1 s. These were: (19) Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, 
(74) Missouri Public Service Company, and (75) Missouri Utilities 
Company. The debt of each of these three companies was privately 
placed, so no market information was available for these debt issues. 
Additionally, the Missouri Utilities Company was controlled by the 
Union Electric Company, which owns 100% of Missouri Utilities Company's 
common stock. 
Data Categorization 
The company data was initially sorted by month. The numeric 
values assigned to each of the 35 months in this study are explained 
in Table II. Each of the thirty-five months under study was further 
subdivided into seventeen rating categories (coded in Table III), 
which in turn were even further subdivided into six fuel source ty~es. 
At this point, the company yield information was printed. After all 
the individual company information had been printed within a specific 
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TABLE II 
NUMERIC EQUIVALENTS FOR EACH MONTH AND YEAR OF THE STUDY 
Month 1978 1979 1980 
January l 13 25 
February 2 14 26 
March 3 15 27 
April 4 16 28 
May 5 17 29 
June 6 18 30 
July 7 19 31 
August 8 20 32 
September 9 21 33 
October 10 22 34 
November 11 23 35 
December 12 24 
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TABLE III 
STANDARD & POOR'S BOND RATING KEY 
Standard & Poor's Numerical 
Rating Notation 
AAA 17 
AA+ 16 
AA 15 
AA- 14 
A+ 13 
A 12 
A- 11 
BBB+ 10 
BBB 9 
BBB- 8 
BB+ 7 
BB 6 
BB- 5 
B+ 4 
B 3 
8- 2 
NR l 
fuel category, a composite average yield and average spread was 
calculated for that particular fuel category. 
This previously mentioned subdividing process began in January, 
1978 and continued through November, 1980. The primary reason for 
limiting the analysis to 35 instead of 36 months was the lack of 
published information. At the time of this report's writing, the 
December, 1980 Standard & Poor's rating and yield rates were undeter-
mined. It is felt that the loss of this one month's data would not 
hamper the results of this study. 
Null Hypothesis 
As was mentioned earlier, the company data were sorted first by 
month, then by rating, and finally by dominant fuel source. At this 
point the null hypothesis tested the equality of the yield and range 
of the six distinct fuel-type averages within each rating level (see 
Table IV). This null hypothesis was applied at each rating level to 
test the equality of the mean yields and to test the equality of the 
mean range values. 
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Tests of these hypotheses before and after the Three-Mile Island 
incident March 28, 1979 were expected to reveal a couple of movements 
taking place. Prior to the shock of Three-Mile Island, it was assumed 
that investors didn't recognize the magnitude of the risk differences 
existing due to one fuel type or another. Consequently both the yield 
rates and deviations from average for the various fuel types were 
considered roughly equal. Once investors were alerted to the various 
risks associated with each fuel type it was expected that the market 
would begin to discriminate aroong the various fuel types, assigning 
high risk premiums to those more risky fuel types, such as nuclear 
fuel. The tests of these null hypotheses were expected to confirm or 
discredit these expectations 
Statistical Testing 
33 
In selecting the statistical test to apply to this analysis, the 
number of means to be compared determined the type of test to u·se. A 
t-test would have been best to use for paired mean values, but an 
F-test was better suited for testing the equality of more than two 
means. 3 Since the null hypothesis included six mean values, the F-test 
was the appropriate test. 
In order to use this test several assumptions about the data had to 
be made. The first was that the data were normally distributed, that is 
that the yields and ranges were normally distributed. Another assump-
tion was that the samples were random and independent. Since all the 
electric utility companies in the United States were looked at there 
was no chance for sampling bias to occur. The final assumption was 
that the population standard deviations were equal. This was necessary 
if the null hypothesis of equal population means was to be tested. 
Reclassification of Data 
In order to construct an analysis of variance table to conduct the 
F-test, some reorganization of the data grouping was required. 
Originally the data was first broken down by month, then by rating, 
and then by fuel source. This finely divided classification system was 
so precise that many divisions had no entries or had zero values. In 
order to maintain the stated assumptions about the data, the classifi-
cation scheme had to be relaxed somewhat. 
TABLE IV 
EQUATIONS FOR DETERMINING AN AVERAGE VALUE* FOR EACH GROUP 
BASED ON A CLASSIFICATION BY STANDARD & POOR'S 
RATING CLASSES 
Average Value* for Each Fuel Type at Each 
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Average Value* _______ _.:.:.R=.a t::...:i..:.:n,;;z_g_:L:..::e:.:.v.::..e l:.....*-*----------,,-----
for Each 
Rating l=Gas 2-0il 3=Coal 
Purchase 4-Hydro 5=Nuclear 6=Power 
Xl7 = (xl7,l + xl7,2 + xl7,3 + xl7,4 + xl7,5 + xl7,6)/6 
Xl6 = (xl6,l + xl6,2 + xl6,3 + xl6,4 + xl6,5 + xl6,6)/6 
xl5 = (xl5,l + xl5,2 + xl5,3 + xl5,4 + xl5,5 + xl5,6)/6 
X14 = (xl4,l + xl4,2 + xl4,3 + xl4,4 + xl4,5 + xl4,6)/6 
Xl3 = (xl3,l + xl3,2 + xl3,3 + xl3,4 + xl3,5 + xl3,6)/6 
X12 = (xl2,l + xl2,2 + xl2,3 + xl2,4 + xl2,5 + xl2,6)/6 
x11 = (x11 , 1 + x11 , 2 + x11 , 3 + x11 , 4 + x11 ,5 + x11 , 6)/6 
X10 = (xlO,l + xl0,2 + xl0,3 + xl0,4 + xl0,5 + xl0,6)/6 
Xg = (x9,l + x9,2 + x9,3 + x9,4 + x9,5 + x9,6)/6 
Xa = (x8,l + x8,2 + x8,3 + x8,4 + x8,5 + x8,6)/ 6 
X7 = (x7,l + x7,2 + x7,3 + x7,4 + x7,5 + x7,6)/6 
X6 = (x6,l + x6,2 + x6,3 + x6,4 + x6,5 + x6,6)/6 
X5 = (x5,l + x5,2 + x5,3 + x5,4 + x5,5 + x5,6)/ 6 
= ( x2, 1 
= (x, 
,1 
+ x4,2 + x4,3 + x4,4 + x4,5 + x4,6)/6 
+ x3,2 + x3,3 + x3,4 + x3,5 + x3,6)/G 
+ x2,2 + x2,3 + x2,4 + x2,5 + x2,6)/6 
+ xl,2 + xl,3 + xl,4 + xl,5 + xl,6)/6 
*Value can be replaced by yield or by range. 
**It is the equality of these fuel type averages within a specific 
rating level that is tested. 
Two new classification schemes emerged as a result of this 
restructuring. For one scheme, the company data was classified by 
month and then by fuel source group. The other plan involved classi-
fication by rating and once again by fuel source. The results of 
these reclassifications will be shown in the next chapter. 
Determination of the Risk Premium 
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The final statistical analysis was undertaken to determine the 
risk premium that investors required when investing in a certain rating 
class of debt. These rating classes were further subdivided into the 
six major fuel source types to determine if different fuel sources 
required different risk premiums. 
The risk-free rate for this section was represented by the average 
monthly yield on 20-year U.S. government bonds (see Table V). This 
long-term risk-free rate was considered the independent variable in 
the regression equations. 
The average yield on securities of utilities of each fuel type 
within each rating class was held to be the dependent variable. This 
dependent variable was regressed against the independent variable to 
arrive at a regression equation for each group. 
These regression equations were derived only for that company data 
located within the ratings numbers 15 through 9. Within this range 
there were entries in nearly all six fuel source categories so there was 
enough data to derive the regression line slope and intercept. In the 
rating groups 17 through 16 and 8 through 1 there was only a sparse 
presence of data, not enough to run a regression against the market data. 
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The results of these regressions of average yield to market yield 
and the F-tests conducted earlier are presented in the following 
chapter. 
January 
February 
March 
Apri 1 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Source: 
TABLE V 
MONTHLY INTEREST RATES REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
RISK FREE RATE 
1978 1979 
8. 14 8.98 
8.22 9.03 
8. 21 9.08 
8.32 9. 12 
8.44 9.21 
8.53 8.91 
8.69 8.97 
8.45 9.21 
8.47 9.99 
8.69 10. 37 
8.75 10. 18 
8.90 10. 65 
Long-term rates on U.S. Government bonds published in the 
1980 
12. 21 
12. 49 
11.42 
10.44 
9.89 
10.32 
11.07 
11. 47 
11. 75 
11. 31 
12.55 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Various Monthly Issues 1978-1980. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, 
D.C. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
The results of those statistical tests and regressions outlined in 
Chapter III are published here in tabular form to facilitate comparisons 
and cursory analysis. These results should provide an indication of 
the presence, or lack of investor ability to assign risk premiums to 
electric utility debt based on the type of fuel used to generate 
electric power. 
The first table in this chapter, Table VI, indicates the dominant 
fuel source for the 140 investor-owned electric utility companies for 
the years 1978 through 1980. As mentioned previously, the dominant 
fuel source can be one of six disparate types: gas, oil, coal, hydro, 
nuclear, and purchased power. The key included in Table VI explains the 
numeric notation used to represent each fuel type. This notation is 
used in the body of the table for consciseness. 
Reading across the first line of Table VI one sees the following: 
Company Number= 1, 1978 = 3, 1979 = 3, and 1980 = 3. This notation 
translates into the following: Company number 1 is the Alabama Power 
Company. In each year 1978 through 1980, the company's dominant fuel 
source was fuel type 3, which is coal. This same company-by-company 
information concerning dominant fuel type was a basic building block for 
the grouping of company data subsequent in the chapter. 
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The next table in this chapter, Table VII, is an abbreviated 
example of the average yield and yield ranges calculated by dominant 
fuel source of investor-owned electric utilities after grouping by 
month, rating, and dominant fuel source. This table, if published 
39 
in its entirety, would have exceeded 3500 lines of print. Since the 
information featured in this table represents intermediate computer 
calculations it was decided, because of time and space constraints, to 
provide the reader with an idea of the type of information processed 
at this point. 
The first line of Table VII is read as follows: Month= 1, 
Rating= 17, Dominant Fuel Source= 1, Fuel Source Average Yield= 
8. 13%, and Fuel Source Average Spread= 1.44. This line translates 
into the following: during January, 1978, those AAA electric utility 
companies using oil as their dominant fuel source, had an average yield 
of 8.13% and an average yield range of 1.44. 
Table VIII, the third table in this chapter, features a month-by-
month presentation of F-test values for testing the equality of average 
yields for investor-owned electric utilities between 1978 and 1980. 
The data tested in this table were grouped first by month and then by 
dominant fuel type. Those F-values noted by(*) were found to be 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table IX also features a month-by-month presentation of F-values. 
The difference between Table IX and Table VIII is that the former 
tests the equality of average yields for investor-owned electric 
utilities between 1978 and 1980, while the latter tests the equality 
of average yield range for these utilities over this same time period. 
Company 
Number 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
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*Gas= l, 
TABLE VI 
DOMINANT FUEL SOURCE FOR INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES FROM 1978 THROUGH 1980* 
Year Company Year 
1978 1979 1980 Number 1978 1979 
3 3 3 36 3 3 
3 3 3 37 6 l 
3 3 3 38 2 2 
2 6 5 39 2 2 
3 3 3 40 3 3 
5 5 5 41 3 3 
6 6 6 42 l l 
3 2 2 43 5 5 
6 l l 44 2 2 
2 6 6 45 l l 
2 2 2 46 4 4 
3 3 3 47 3 3 
2 2 2 48 3 5 
3 3 3 49 3 3 
3 3 3 50 3 3 
l l l 51 5 5 
5 2 2 52 5 3 
l l l 53 5 6 
5 5 5 54 3 3 
3 3 3 55 3 3 
6 6 l 56 4 6 
3 3 3 57 3 3 
3 3 3 58 l l 
3 3 3 59 l 3 
6 6 6 60 3 3 
5 5 5 61 3 3 
2 2 2 62 2 2 
3 3 3 63 l l 
l 3 l 64 3 3 
3 3 3 65 3 3 
2 2 2 66 5 5 
3 3 3 67 6 6 
3 3 3 68 3 3 
3 3 3 69 3 6 
l l l 70 3 3 
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1980 
3 
l 
2 
2 
3 
3 
l 
5 
2 
l 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
l 
3 
3 
5 
6 
3 
3 
3 
Oil= 2, Coal = 3, Hydro= 4, Nuclear= 5, Purchase Power= 6 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
Company Year Company 
Number 1978 1979 1980 Number 1978 1979 1980 
71 2 2 2 106 2 3 3 
72 6 6 6 107 3 3 3 
73 6 6 6 108 l l l 
74 3 3 3 109 2 2 5 
75 6 6 6 110 4 6 6 
76 3 3 3 111 5 5 5 
77 3 3 3 112 3 3 3 
78 4 4 4 113 2 2 2 
79 6 6 6 114 2 2 3 
80 3 3 3 115 l 1 6 
81 2 6 6 116 3 3 3 
82 2 2 2 117 2 2 2 
83 2 l 6 118 3 3 3 
84 3 3 3 119 3 3 3 
85 6 6 6 120 l 1 l 
86 3 3 3 121 1 1 1 
87 3 3 3 122 3 3 3 
88 3 6 6 123 3 3 3 
89 3 3 3 124 l 1 1 
90 3 3 3 125 l 3 1 
91 3 3 3 126 3 3 3 
92 l l l 127 3 3 3 
93 2 2 2 128 3 3 3 
94 3 3 3 129 6 6 6 
95 2 l l 130 2 2 l 
96 3 3 3 131 3 3 3 
97 3 3 3 132 5 5 5 
98 3 3 3 133 3 2 3 
99 2 3 3 134 6 4 4 
100 6 6 5 135 3 3 3 
l 01 6 6 6 136 l l l 
l 02 3 3 3 137 5 5 5 
103 3 3 3 138 3 3 3 
104 3 3 3 139 3 3 3 
105 3 3 3 140 3 3 3 
*Gas= l , Oil= 2, Coal = 3, Hydro= 4, Nuclear= 5, Purchase Power= 6 
Source: Interstate Securities Corporation Interstate Securities 
Electric Utilities Atlas, Charlotte, North Carolina, Years 
1978, 1979, 1980. 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
l 
l 
l 
l 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
35 
TABLE VII 
EXAMPLE OF AVERAGES CALCULATED BY DOMINANT FUEL SOURCE OF 
INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES AFTER GROUPING BY 
MONTH, RATING, AND DOMINANT FUEL SOURCE 
Dominant Fuel Source Fuel Source 
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Rating Fuel Source Average Yield Average Yield Range 
17 1 8. 13 1.44 
17 2 0.00 0.00 
17 3 8.00 0.62 
17 4 0.00 0.00 
17 5 0.00 0.00 
17 6 0.00 0.00 
16 1 0.00 0.00 
16 2 0.00 0.00 
16 3 0.00 0.00 
16 4 0.00 0.00 
16 5 0.00 0.00 
16 6 8.28 0.72 
15 1 8.28 0.70 
15 2 8.61 1. 69 
15 3 8.25 1. 10 
15 4 0.00 0.00 
15 5 8.28 1.06 
15 6 8. 16 0.67 
14 1 8.28 1. 51 
14 2 8.28 1. 51 
14 3 8.28 1. 51 
14 4 8.28 1. 51 
14 5 8.28 1. 51 
14 6 8.28 1. 51 
2 6 0.00 0.00 
l l 0.00 0.00 
l 2 0.00 0.00 
l 3 0.00 0.00 
l 4 0.00 0.00 
l 5 0.00 0.00 
l 6 6.79 0. 13 
Once again, those F-values noted by(*) were found to be significant 
at the 0.05 level. 
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The next table, Table X, presents the F-test values for testing 
the equality of average yields for electric utilities between 1978 and 
1980 when grouped first by rating and then by dominant fuel type. This 
table differs from Table VIII only by the way the data were grouped. 
In this table the data were grouped first by rating and then by 
dominant fuel type. In Table VIII, the data were grouped first by 
month and then by dominant fuel type. Just as in Table VIII, those 
F-values noted by(*) were found to be significant at the 0.05 level. 
The final set of F-test tables, Table XI, features the F-test 
values for testing the equality of average range of electric utility 
yield rates between 1978 and 1980 when grouped first by rating and then 
by dominant fuel type. This table relates to Table X in the same manner 
that Table IX relates to Table VIII. As before, those F-values noted 
by(*) were found to be significant at the 0.05 level. 
Recapping the information contained in Tables VIII, IX, X, and XI 
one finds that the data tested in Tables VIII and IX were grouped 
first by month and then by dominant fuel type. The data tested in 
Tables X and XI were grouped first by Standard & Poor's rating and then 
by dominant fuel type. The F-values in Tables VIII and X tested the 
equality of average yields for electric utilities between 1978 and 
1980, while those F-values in Tables IX and XI tested the equality of 
the average range of electric utility yield rates over the same time 
period. 
Table XII, the final table in this chapter, displays the results 
of regressions of selected rate classes of electric utility bonds against 
Month 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
TABLE VII I 
F-TEST VALUES FOR TESTING THE EQUALITY OF AVERAGE YIELDS FOR 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980 WHEN GROUPED 
FIRST BY MONTH AND THEN DOMINANT FUEL TYPE 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Squares Freedom of Variance 
Total 1902.72 l 01 
Between** 172.36 5 34.47 
Within*** 1730.36 96 18.02 
Total 1948.05 101 
Between 17 4. 77 5 34.95 
Within 1773. 28 96 18. 47 
Total 1965.36 l 01 
Between 180.95 5 36.19 
Within 1784.41 96 18.58 
Total 1963.88 101 
Between 177. 27 5 35.45 
Within 1786.61 96 18. 61 
Total 2026.68 l 01 
Between 183.26 5 36.65 
Within 1843.42 96 19.20 
Total 2098.77 l 01 
Between 191. 79 5 38.35 
Within 1906.97 96 19.86 
Total 2145.87 l 01 
Between 174.62 5 34.92 
Within 1971. 24 96 20.53 
Total 2160.46 l 01 
Between 173.21 5 34. 64 
Within 1987. 25 96 20.70 
Total 2074.56 l 01 
Between 129.87 5 25.97 
Within 1944.68 96 20.25 
Total 2101.81 101 
Between 174.19 5 34.83 
Within 1927. 62 96 20.07 
Total 2277 .15 l 01 
Between 182.34 5 36.46 
Within 2094.80 96 21. 82 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
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F* 
l. 91 
1.89 
l. 95 
l. 91 
l. 91 
l. 93 
l. 70 
1.67 
l. 28 
l. 74 
1.67 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Month Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
12 Total 2389.42 101 
Between 167.26 5 33.45 1. 45 
Within 2222.15 96 23. 14 
13 Total 2592.97 101 
Between 347.42 5 69.48 2.97 
Within 2245.54 96 23.39 
14 Total 2563.09 101 
Between 337.94 5 67.58 2.92 
Within 2225. 15 96 23.17 
15 Total 2583.08 101 
Between 340.53 5 68. 10 2.92 
Within 2242.54 96 23.35 
16 Total 2599.98 101 
Between 346.88 5 69.37 2.96 
Within 2253.09 96 23.46 
17 Total 2666.63 101 
Between 356.75 5 71. 35 2.97 
Within 2309.87 96 24.06 
18 Total 2705.92 101 
Between 366.75 5 3.01 
Within 2339. 16 96 24.36 
19 Total 2625.33 101 
Between 352.55 5 2.98 
Within 2272. 78 96 23.67 
20 Total 2585.24 101 
Between 361. 77 5 72. 35 3. 12 
Within 2223.46 96 23. 16 
21 Total 2583.06 101 
Between 362.50 5 72. 50 3. 13 Within 2220.56 96 23. 13 
22 Total 2753.41 101 
Between 387.82 5 77. 56 3. 15 Within 2365.59 96 24.64 
23 Total 4184.57 101 
Between 494.57 5 98. 91 2.57 Within 3690.00 96 38.43 
24 Total 3556.21 101 
Between 593.29 5 118. 65 3.84 Within 2962.91 96 30.86 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Month Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
25 Total 3799.23 101 
Between 341. 13 5 68.22 1. 89 
Within 3458.09 96 36.02 
26 Total 4192. 71 101 
Between 400.77 5 80. 15 2.03 
Within 3791.93 96 39.49 
27 Total 5260.47 101 
Between 486.32 5 97.26 1. 96 
Within 4774. 15 96 49.73 
28 Total 5812.23 l 01 
Between 524.77 5 104.95 1. 91 
Within 5287.45 96 55.07 
29 Total 4592.78 l 01 
Between 394.60 5 78.92 1. 80 
Within 4198.17 96 43.73 
30 Total 3664.89 101 
Between 312.65 5 62.53 1. 79 
Within 3352.23 96 34. 91 
31 Total 3375.24 101 
Between 282.79 5 56.55 1. 76 
Within 3092.44 96 32.21 
32 Total 3579.43 101 
Between 300.03 5 60.00 1. 76 
Within 3279.40 96 34.16 
33 Total 4165.67 10] 
Between 345.72 5 69. 14 1. 74 
Within 3819.94 96 39.79 
34 Total 4631. 71 101 
Between 391.69 5 78. 33 1. 77 
Within 4240.02 96 44. 16 
35 Total 4741. 77 l 01 
Between 398.23 5 79.64 1. 76 
Within 4343.54 96 45.24 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
**Represents between group variation. 
*** Represents within group variation. 
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TABLE IX 
F-TEST VALUES FOR TESTING THE EQUALITY OF AVERAGE RANGES OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITY YIELD RATES BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980 WHEN GROUPED FIRST 
BY MONTH AND THEN DOMINANT FUEL TYPE 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Month Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
1 Total 33.93 101 
Between** 2.29 5 0.45 1. 39 
Within*** 31.64 96 0.32 
2 Total 27.27 101 
Between 2.91 5 0.58 2.30 
Within 24.36 96 0.25 
3 Total 31. 28 101 
Between 2. 17 5 0.43 1.44 
Within 29. 10 96 0.30 
4 Total 30.66 101 
Between 2.55 5 0. 51 1. 75 
Within 28. 11 96 0.29 
5 Total 28.98 101 
Between 2.35 5 0.47 l. 69 
Within 26.63 96 0.27 
6 Total 30.87 101 
Between l. 92 5 0.38 1. 28 
Within 28.95 96 0.30 
7 Total 33.96 101 
Between 2. 16 5 0.43 1. 31 
Within 31.79 96 0.33 
8 Total 27.97 101 
Between 2.05 5 0.41 1. 52 
Within 25. 91 96 0.26 
9 Total 20.30 101 
Between 0.93 5 0. 18 0.93 
Within 19. 36 96 0.20 
10 Total 32.44 101 
Between l. 63 5 0.32 l. 02 
Within 30.80 96 0.32 
11 Total 37.00 101 
Between 3.92 5 0.78 2.28 
Within 33.07 96 0.34 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE IX (Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Month Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
12 Total 20.40 101 
Between l. 39 5 0.27 1.41 
Within 19. 00 96 0. 19 
13 Total 20.97 101 
Between 2.29 5 0.45 2.36 
Within 18. 67 96 0. 19 
14 Total 21.05 101 
Between 2.50 5 0.50 2.60 
Within 18.55 96 o. 19 
15 Total 18.69 101 
Between l. 78 5 0.35 2.02 
Within 16.91 96 0. 17 
16 Total 14. 45 101 
Between l. 51 5 0.30 2.24 
Within 12.94 96 0. 13 
17 Total 27. 16 l 01 
Between 3.26 5 0.65 2.62 
Within 23.90 96 0.24 
18 Total 17.40 l 01 
Between 2.01 5 0.40 2. 51 
Within 15. 38 96 0. 16 
19 Total 24.76 101 
Between l.81 5 0.36 1.52 
Within 22.94 96 0.23 
20 Total 14. 61 l 0] 
Between l. 09 5 0.21 l. 55 
Within 13. 51 96 0. 14 
21 Total 12.58 101 
Between 1.23 5 0.24 2.09 
Within 11.35 96 0. l l 
22 Total 28.85 101 
Between 2.82 5 0.56 2.08 
Within 26.02 96 0.27 
23 Total 1077. 82 101 
Between 71.82 5 14.36 l. 37 
Within l 006. 00 96 10.47 
24 Total 114. 03 101 
Between 16. 05 5 3.21 3. 15 
Within 97.98 96 l. 02 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE IX (Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Month Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
25 Total 352.89 101 
Between 20.74 5 4. 14 1. 20 
Within 332. 15 96 3.45 
26 Total 109. 18 101 
Between 10.53 5 2.10 2.05 
Within 98.65 96 1. 02 
27 Total 82.87 101 
Between 5.08 5 1.01 1. 25 
Within 77. 79 96 0. 81 
28 Total 119. 01 101 
Between 9.23 5 1.84 1. 61 
Within 109. 78 96 1. 14 
29 Total 69.99 101 
Between 4. 51 5 0.90 1.32 
Within 65.47 96 0.68 
30 Total 57.92 101 
Between 3.37 5 0.67 1. 19 
Within 54.54 96 0.56 
31 Total 83.70 101 
Between 5.90 5 1. 18 1.46 
Within 77. 79 96 0.81 
32 Total 84.31 101 
Between 5.49 5 1. 09 1. 34 
Within 78.81 96 0.82 
33 Total 95.31 101 
Between 5.81 5 1. 16 1. 25 
Within 89.50 96 0.93 
34 Total 122.60 101 
Between . 5. 71 5 1. 14 0.94 
Within 116. 89 96 1. 21 
35 Total 147. 98 101 
Between 6.64 5 1. 32 0.90 
Within 141. 33 96 1.47 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
**Represents between group variation. 
***Represents within group variation. 
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TABLE X 
F-TEST VALUES FOR TESTING THE EQUALITY OF AVERAGE YIELDS FOR ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980 WHEN GROUPED FIRST BY 
RATING AND THEN DOMINANT FUEL TYPE 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Rating Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
l Total 1934.26 209 
Between** 1830. 18 5 366.03 717.38* 
Within*** 104.08 204 0.51 
2 Total 0.00 209 
Between o.oo 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
3 Total 0.00 209 
Between 0.00 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
4 Total 0.00 209 
Between 0.00 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
5 Total 4841. 89 209 
Between 3918.82 5 783.76 173.21* 
Within 923.06 204 4.52 
6 Total 7511.89 209 
Between 3868.33 5 773. 66 43.32* 
Within 3643.47 204 17.86 
7 Total 5158.21 209 
Between 3455.26 5 691.05 82. 78* 
Within 1702.94 204 8.34 
8 Total 7083.65 209 
Between 2284. 19 5 456.83 19.42* 
Within 4799.45 204 23.52 
9 Total 720.90 209 
Between 7. 31 5 1.46 0.42 
Within 713.58 204 3.49 
10 Total 6719.51 209 
Between 2994. 13 5 598.82 32.79* 
Within 3725. 37 204 18. 26 
11 Total 3616.94 209 
Between 1388. 58 5 277. 71 25.42* 
Within 2228.36 204 10.92 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Rating Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
12 Total 633. 61 209 
Between 1.35 5 0.27 0.09 
Within 632.25 204 3.09 
13 Total 5998.85 209 
Between 4406.01 5 881.20 112.86* 
Within 1592.83 204 7.80 
14 Total 6366.84 209 
Between 4902.80 5 980.56 136.63* 
Within 1464. 04 204 7. 17 
15 Total 4537.56 209 
Between 3160.81 5 632.16 93.67* 
Within 1376.74 204 6. 74 
16 Total 3161.33 209 
Between 1241. 69 5 248.33 26.39* 
Within 1919. 64 204 9.41 
17 Total 4814.46 209 
Between 4650.91 5 930. 18 1160. 27* 
Within 163.54 204 0.80 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
**Represents between group variation. 
***Represents within group variation. 
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TABLE XI 
F-TEST VALUES FOR TESTING THE EQUALITY OF AVERAGE RANGES OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITY YIELD RATES BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980 WHEN GROUPED 
FIRST BY RATING AND THEN BY DOMINANT FUEL TYPE 
Sum of Degrees of Estimate 
Rating Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
1 Total 0.31 209 
Between** 0.20 5 0.04 73.00* 
Within*** o. 11 204 0.00 
2 Total 0.00 209 
Between 0.00 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
3 Total 0.00 209 
Between 0.00 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
4 Total 0.00 209 
Between 0.00 5 0.00 99,999.99* 
Within 0.00 204 0.00 
5 Total 3.09 209 
Between 1. 14 5 0.22 23.86* 
Within 1. 95 204 0.00 
6 Total 85.96 209 
Between 14. 76 5 2.95 8.46* 
Within 71. 19 204 0.34 
7 Total 5.69 209 
Between 0.90 5 0. 18 7.68* 
Within 4.79 204 0.02 
8 Total 209.66 209 
Between 68. 17 5 13.63 19. 66* 
Within 141. 49 204 0.69 
9 Total 107.35 209 
Between 47.91 5 9.58 32.88* 
Within 59.44 204 0.29 
10 Total 112.77 209 
Between 40.99 5 8. 19 23.30* 
Within 71. 77 204 0.35 
11 Total 105.04 209 
Between 46.77 5 9.35 32. 76* 
Within 58.26 204 0.28 
*F-value significant at the . 05 level. 
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TABLE XI {Continued) 
Sum of Degrees of Estimates 
Rating Squares Freedom of Variance F* 
1? Total 62.82 209 
Between 7.09 5 1. 41 5. 19* 
Within 55.72 204 0.27 
13 Total 88.54 209 
Between 51. 89 5 10. 37 57.77* 
Within 36.65 204 0. 17 
14 Total 1164. 76 209 
Between 68.91 5 13. 78 2.57 
Within 1095.84 204 5. 37 
15 Total 585.38 209 
Between 230.60 5 46. 12 26.52* 
Within 354.78 204 1. 73 
16 Total 48.65 209 
Between 3. 10 5 0.62 2.78 
Within 45.55 204 0.22 
17 Total 75. 71 209 
Between 21.83 5 10. 77 100.68* 
Within 53.87 204 0. 10 
*F-value significant at the .05 level. 
**Represents between group variation. 
***Represents within group variation. 
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long-term U.S. government returns for the years 1978 through 1980. Those 
selected rate classes were classes 15 through 9, those areas within which 
most of the electric utility bonds lie. 
Just as the clues to a mystery begin to add up and hint at a 
solution, so have the statistical tables presented thus far given clues 
to the investor ability to assign risk premiums to utility bonds based 
on the fuel type used. Chapter V will take these clues already presented 
and reveal a discussion of the conclusion reached. 
TABLE XII 
REGRESSIONS OF SELECTED RATE CLASSES OF ELECTRIC UTILITY BONDS 
AGAINST LONG-TERM U.S. GOVERNMENT RETURNS FOR 
YEARS 1978-1980 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 15 = AA 
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas 1. 00 0.56 
2 = Oil 1. 34 -1.99 
3 = Coal 1. 02 0.39 
4 = Hydro 0.00* 0.00* 
5 = Nuclear 1. 53 -8.06 
6 = Purchase Power 1.10 -0.49 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 14 = AA-
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Int~rcept 
1 = Gas 1. 11 -0.27 
2 = Qi 1 -2. 13 23.69 
3 = Coa 1 1. 31 -2.36 
4 = Hydro 0.00* 0.00* 
5 = Nuclear 0.85 2.23 
6 = Purchase Power 0.00* 0.00* 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 13 = A+ 
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas -0.76 10. 96 
2 = Oil 1.06 0.25 
3 = Coal 1.10 -0.07 
4 = Hydro 0.00* 0.00* 
5 = Nuclear 0.00* 0.00* 
6 = Purchase Power 1. 66 -14.77 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 12 = A 
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas 1.08 0.09 
2 = Oil 1. 07 0. 31 
3 = Coal 1. 23 -1.20 
4 = Hydro 1. 05 0. 41 
5 = Nuclear 1.11 -0.04 
6 = Purchase Power 1. 10 -0.02 
*Indicates the absence of data for this fuel type. 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 11 = A-
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas 1.08 0.09 
2 = Oi 1 1. 07 0.31 
3 = Coa 1 1. 23 .:.1. 20 
4 = Hydro 1. 05 0. 41 
5 = Nuclear 1.11 -0.04 
6 = Purchase Power 1. 10 -0.02 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 10 = BBB+ 
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas -0.78 11 . 21 
2 = Oil 2.03 -10.32 
3 = Coa 1 1. 13 0.00 
4 = Hydro 0.00* 0.00* 
5 = Nuclear -0.05 6.03 
6 = Purchase Power 2.29 -19.34 
Standard & Poor's Rating: 9 = BBB 
Dominant Fuel Source Slope Intercept 
1 = Gas 1. 00 1. 11 
2 = Oil 1. 23 -0.84 
3 = Coal 1. 19 -0.36 
4 = Hydro 1. 13 -0.04 
5 = Nuclear 1. 19 -0.23 
6 = Purchased Power 1.11 0. 15 
*Indicates the absence of data for this fuel type. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The table of annual breakdown of company power generation by 
dominant fuel source, Table VI, revealed several interesting findings. 
Out of the 140 investor-owned electric utility companies studied over 
the three years 1978 through 1980, 31 companies changed their major 
fuel source at least once. Seven of these utility companies changed 
their fuel source twice over this three-year-period. 
While no apparent trend to any one specific fuel source was 
present, a couple of other trends were detected. Some utility com-
panies began 1978 using one particular fuel type, switched to another 
in 1979, and then returned to the original fuel in 1980. Other com-
panies seemed to change, choosing a different fuel each year. What-
ever the utilities' reasons for changing, it was obvious that they were 
not moving away from any one particular fuel type but were seeking the 
lowest cost source. 
The short time span considered and the fact that the companies 
were classified on the basis of dominant, not sole fuel type used, 
prohibits one from drawing conclusions on the long-run fuel source 
trends. 
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A recent article published in the Wall Street Journal indicated 
that "many utilities have found that the burden of building a nuclear 
plant has contributed to the lowering of their securities by rating 
services. The downgrading, in time, pushes up the cost of borrowing 
and scares away some investors. 111 
Right now the nuclear-power industry is pinning its hopes for 
future survival on the Reagan administration. Nuclear power-plant 
advocates want a strong, favorable statement from President Reagan 
that will set the tone for the nation. 2 In addition to encouraging 
words, the nuclear-power industry will press for an overhaul of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In summary, while nuclear-power 
advocates want less government involvement in safety regulation, they 
want more government involvement in financing the development of 
commercial nuclear power. 3 
Nuclear critics, on the other hand, want the market to determine 
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the fate of nuclear power. Says Mr. Pollock of Critical, Massachusetts, 
"If it can stand on its own feet, fine. If it can't, the market has 
spoken. 114 
Referring back to Table VIII, one finds that none of the F-values 
were significant at the 0.05 level. One can conclude from this test 
that the average yields for electric utility bonds between 1978 and 
1980, when grouped first by month and then by dominant fuel type, were 
statistically equivalent. Phrased differently, for any given month of 
this study, the average yield on electric utility bonds was equal 
regardless of the dominant fuel type used to generate electricity. Thus 
the bond market does not appear to require an added premium due to the 
use of nuclear fuel sources. Consequently, investors appear to rely 
heavily on the rating agencies and do not discriminate within rating 
groups by requiring higher yields from nuclear-powered utility bonds. 
Table IX displayed the same statistical results as did Table 
VIII. None of the F-values were significant at the 0.05 level. From 
this table one can conclude that the average ranges of electric 
utility yield rates between 1978 and 1980, when grouped first by month 
and then by dominant fuel type, were not statistically different 
from each other. In other words, for any given month of this study, 
the average ranges of electric utility yield rates on electric 
utility bonds was equal regardless of the dominant fuel type used to 
generate electric power. 
Considering the information outlined in Tables VIII and IX one 
could conclude that the events occurring over time seem to affect all 
the fuel types in a similar manner. 
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The results displayed in Table X, which tested the equality of 
average yields for electric utilities between 1978 and 1980, when 
grouped first by rating and then by dominant fuel type, indicate that 
the F-values were significant at the 0.05 level for all rating levels 
with the exception of ratings 9 and 12. This means that for ratings 
1-8, 10-11, and 13-17 the average yields corresponding to the disparate 
fuel types were not equal. Only for ratings 9 and 12 were the average 
yields for the six distinct fuel types equal. 
Table XI, which tested the equality of the average range of 
electric utility yield rates between 1978 and 1980 when grouped first 
by rating and then by dominant fuel type, displayed F-values which 
were significant at the 0.05 level for all rating levels except for 
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ratings 14 and 16. This can be interpreted to mean that for ratings 
1-13, 15, and 17 the average range of yields corresponding to the 
various fuel types were not equal. Only for ratings 14 and 16 were the 
average yield ranges for the six disparate fuel types equal. 
The information presented in Tables X and XI indicates that both 
the average yields and the average yield ranges were not equal for all 
fuel types over the period January, 1978 through Novenber, 1980. Since 
this test did not analyze the average yields and average yield ranges 
on a year-by-year basis, it is difficult to ascertain the shock effects 
of the Three-Mile Island accident of March, 1979. These shock effects 
could have contributed to the distortion of the average yields, 
alluding to the possibility that the rating agencies are not re-evaluating 
the electric utilities' debt in pace with changes affecting the companies. 
If this were the case, this would suggest that debt investors have 
already discounted their information about the company and have made 
adjustments in the yields that they require on various electric utility 
bonds. 
The final table in this chapter, Table XII, lists the results of 
the regressions of selected rate classes of electric utility bonds 
against long-term U.S. government returns for the years 1978 through 
1980. If the two rates were perfectly correlated, one would expect to 
find the slope of the regression line equal to one and the intercept 
equal to zero. 
As Table XII indicates, most of the regressions run had slopes 
statistically similar to 1.00 and intercepts likewise similar to 0.00. 
There were a very few exceptions to this finding. Those were due 
primarily to random one-month deviations explainable by other factors. 
Thus these results indicate that these electric utility rates closely 
follow the yield rate trends of long-term U.S. government securities. 
Recommendations 
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As was mentioned earlier, one limitation of this study was the 
relatively short time frame examined. In a few years it would be 
possible to collect a greater data base and repeat a similar analysis of 
the data. Perhaps this greater time frame and data base would yield 
different findings. 
During the early stages of this analysis, a cursory examination of 
the debt characteristics of a sampling of utility bonds was reviewed to 
ascertain whether there were any differences in the terms of electric 
utility debt based on fuel types. The author's examination of such 
information as published in Moody's Public Utility Manual did not 
uncover such differences. What differences in debt terms that existed 
were probably due to such other things as regulatory environment, the 
bond market condition when the issues were floated, and such other factors. 
A possible method of further study of this issue of debt charact-
eristics would be to develop a classification scheme for sorting these 
debt terms. With this scheme intact a test could be devised to check for 
differences in such characteristics based on fuel type. Maybe this would 
uncover financing differences between utilities based on fuel types used 
to generate electrical power. 
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2 
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18 
19 
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21 
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23 
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31 
32 
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36 
37 
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39 
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41 
42 
TABLE XII I 
ELECTRIC UTILITY COMPANIES ANALYZED 
Name 
Alabama Power Company 
Appalachian Power Company 
Arizona Public Service Company 
Arkansas Power and Light Company 
Atlantic City Electric Company 
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company 
Blackstone Valley Electric Company 
Boston Edison Company 
Brockton Edison Company 
Cambridge Electric Light Company 
Canal Electric Company 
Carolina Power and Light 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation 
Central Illinois Light Company 
Central Illinois Public Service Company 
Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc. 
Central Maine Power Company 
Central Power and Light Company 
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation 
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 
Citizens Utilities Company 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company 
Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Company 
Commonwealth Edison Company 
Community Public Service Company 
Connecticut Light and Power Company 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. 
Consumers Power Company 
Dallas Power and Light Company 
Dayton Power and Light Company 
Delmarva Power and Light Company 
Detroit Edison Company 
Duke Power Company 
Duquesne Light Company 
El Paso Electric Company 
Empire District Electric Company 
Fall River Electric Light Company 
Florida Power Corporation 
Florida Power and Light Company 
Georgia Power Company 
Gulf Power Company 
Gulf States Utilities Company 
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44 
45 
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72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Name 
Hartford Electric Light Company 
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. 
Houston Lighting and Power Company 
Idaho Power Company 
Illinois Power Company 
Indian and Michigan Electric Company 
Indianapolis Power and Light Company 
Interstate Power Company 
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company 
Idwa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company 
Iowa Power and Light Company 
Iowa Public Service Company 
Iowa Southern Utilities Company 
Jersey Central Power and Light Company 
Kansas City Power and Light Company 
Kansas Gas and Electric Company 
Kansas Power and Light Company 
Kentucky Power Company 
Kentucky Utilities Company 
Long Island Lighting Company 
Louisiana Power and Light Company 
Louisville Gas and Electric Company 
Madison Gas and Electric Company 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 
Massachusetts Electric Company 
Metropolitan Edison Company 
Minnesota Power and Light Company 
Mississippi Power Company 
Mississippi Power and Light Company 
Missouri Edison Company 
Missouri Power and Light Company 
Missouri Public Service Company 
Missouri Utilities Company 
Monongahela Power Company 
Montana-Dakota Utilities Company 
Montana Power Company 
Narragansett Electric Company 
Nevada Power Company 
New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Company 
New England Power Company 
New Orleans Public Service Inc. 
New York State Electric and Gas Corporation 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
Northern Indiana Public Service Company 
Northern States Power Company (Minnesota) 
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88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
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113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Name 
Northern States Power Company (Wisconsin) 
Northwestern Public Service Company 
Ohio Edison Company 
Ohio Power Company 
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company 
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Incorporated 
Otter Tail Power Company 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
Pacific Power and Light Company 
Pennsylvania Electric Company 
Pennsylvania Power Company 
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 
Philadelphia Electric Company 
Portland General Electric Company 
Potomac Edison Company 
Potomac Power Company 
Public Service Company of Colorado 
Public Service Company of Indiana, Incorporated 
Public Service Company of New Hampshire 
Public Service Company of New Mexico 
Public Service Company of Oklahoma 
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 
Puget Sound Power and Light Company 
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 
St. Joseph Light and Power Company 
San Diego Gas and Electric Company 
Savannah Electric and Power Company 
Sierra Pacific Power Company 
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company 
Southern California Edison Company 
Southern Electric Generating Company 
Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company 
Southwestern Electric Power Company 
Southwestern Public Service Company 
Tampa Electric Company 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Texas Electric Service Company 
Texas Power and Light Company 
Toledo Edison Company 
Tucson Gas and Electric Company 
Union Electric Company 
Union Light, Heat and Power Company 
United Illuminating Company 
Utah Power and Light Company 
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Number 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
1~ 
TABLE XIII {Continued) 
Name 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 
Virginia Electric and Power Company 
Washington Water Power Company 
West Penn Power Company 
West Texas Utilities Company 
Western Massachusetts Electric Company 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company 
Wisconsin Power and Light Company 
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 
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